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Introduction
In 2007 Sweden reported the highest labor force participation rate among females aged 25 to 54 in the OECD -87.1 %.
1 As a matter of fact, Sweden reached the 2007 OECD average level, which is 70.3 %, already in 1974. Thus, the gender composition of the labor force today in most OECD countries has more in common with the Swedish situation in the 1970's than the present one. To study the Swedish transition from a country with modest to high female labour force participation rates is therefore a venture of substantial policy relevance.
As can be seen from Figure 1 , the rapid growth in female participation rates in Sweden during the post-war era was primarily driven by a surge in married women's participation rates. In the mid 1980's the gap between married and unmarried participation rates had virtually vanished. One purported explanation to this unprecedented growth, alongside factors as technological change in home production and the expansion of the public sector, is the profound reforms in the area of family taxation. These culminated in the individual tax reform of 1971.
As the 1971 reform radically increased net wages for a large number of married women it is often considered to have increased labour force participation of married women.
However, it is a priori unclear if, or to what extent, the tax reform contributed to this development. As documented by Pencavel (1998a) , employment-population ratios for married and unmarried women have converged also in the U.S. since the 1970's in a system with joint family taxation. The impact from the structure of family taxation on Swedish female labour force participation has historically been analysed based on cross sectional evidence (Gustafsson 1992 and Gustafsson and Jacobsson 1985) . 2 The widely held belief that the 1971 tax reform increased female labor force participation has, however, still not been tested by the exogenous variation provided by the tax policy reform itself. Undisputedly, the family tax reform provides a quasi-experimental situation: Before 1971 the earnings of each spouse were added together and taxed according to a steeply progressive tax schedule. This meant that the average tax rate facing the housewife was a function of the 'last-dollar' marginal tax rate of her husband. After the reform, the link between the husband's earned income and the wife's average tax rate was in principle abolished. Accordingly, the 1971 reform affected work incentives of different wives differently depending on their husband's pre-reform earnings. Wives married to husbands at the very top of the income distribution faced average tax rate cuts of a magnitude of 40 percentage points whereas women married to lower-income husbands could face small increases.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the impact from the individual tax reform on female employment. The leading idea of the empirical model is to identify the change in the log net wage rate (evaluated at 30 weekly work hours) by the exogenous variation in average tax rates provided by the tax reform. To this end I will use longitudinal individual level data from the LINDA data base from two points in time: 1969, i.e. two years before the reform was launched but the year before it was announced, and 1975, four years after the reform.
Since the data contain tax register information on the spouse I will be able to test whether those who faced large exogenous increases in net wage rates (wives married to high-income men) were more prone to go from non-work to work than women whose first-dollar marginal tax rates did not fall (women married to low-income husbands).
In the estimations I employ a linear probability model that allows for individual level fixed effects. I obtain a preferred estimate of the elasticity of the employment probability with respect to the net-of-tax share of 0.46. This estimate is of expected sign and is also statistically different from zero. I also find a statistically significant non-labour income elasticity of -0.14. The most central component of non-labor income is the net-of-tax earnings of the husband. However, these overall elasticity estimates conceal substantial heterogeneity between women with and without kids. In fact, women with kids both years exhibit a considerably higher net-of-tax share elasticity that is estimated to 1.77. 
Background
During the 1990's it became increasingly popular to estimate labor supply by making use of exogenous policy reforms. To a large extent, this literature centered on various earned income tax credit policies. One common strategy has been to compare labor market outcomes of eligible and non-eligible to income tax credits with data from before and after a policy-reform (Eissa and Liebman 1996) or with data from several time periods (Francesconi and van der Klaauw 2007). A general lesson from this empirical literature, which has been summarized by Eissa and Hoynes (2005) for the U.S., is that the labor supply response of women appears to be concentrated along the extensive rather than the intensive margin. 3 These findings are coherent with results obtained in the traditional labor supply literature (Mroz 1987 ).
There is also a minor quasi-experimental literature that focuses on the labour supply response of married women to income tax reforms. While adopting a difference-in-difference methodology, Eissa (1995 Eissa ( ,1996 studies the supply of labor of wives, both along the extensive and intensive margins. The strategy is to compare women married to husbands at the very top of the income distribution with women married to men who are located somewhat lower on the income distribution, groups that are treated differently by the tax reform. Eissa uses two U.S. tax reforms (ERTA81 and TRA86) as exogenous variation and repeated individual cross sections before and after the reforms. 4 Recently, Crossley and Jeon (2007) have directly adopted the methodology of Eissa while studying a Canadian family tax reform of 1988.
3 Empirical research on Swedish data on labour supply responsiveness to income taxation has traditionally not been conducted in quasi-experimental settings. An exception is Klevmarken (2000) , who utilizes the Swedish tax reform act of 1991 to study labor supply along the continuous margin among both males and females on a smaller panel data set (HUS). There are also recent examples (e.g. Hansson (2007) and Blomquist and Selin (2009)) on Swedish papers on the elasticity of taxable income. The responsiveness in taxable income can be viewed as a wider measure of labor supply. To some extent, the empirical strategy of this paper is related to those studies. 4 The Eissa (1995 Eissa ( ,1996 papers have been discussed from various angles by Blundell et al (1998) , Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) , Heckman (1996) and Liebman and Saez (2006) . One concern that has been raised is that the assumption of constant group composition, which is needed for consistency of the difference-in-difference estimator, is likely to be violated when grouping is made based on the income of the husband before and after a large tax reform. Since tax reforms tend to affect both spouses it cannot be ruled out that the composition of income groups is altered in a non-random way due to a reform. In contrast to the above mentioned works this paper will not pursue an identification strategy that relies on group heterogeneity. There are at least two very good reasons for this.
First, if grouping is based on the income of the primary earner, it is impossible to separate the net wage effect from a non-labour income effect. Second, as pointed at by Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) , the 'treatment' that individuals typically obtain from income tax reforms is rarely dichotomous in nature. Conversely, different taxpayers are usually treated differently by an income tax reform, even within a certain tax bracket owing to the complexity of the income tax system. Apart from the federal tax bracket of the husband, the change in tax incentives more often than not depend on other parameters as the number of children, local tax rates and various deductions. In the Swedish case, these other sources of variation are important. Hence, in this paper I will employ an estimation strategy that exploits individual heterogeneity in tax rates and non-labor income as the identifying source of variation.
Tax system and economic environment
Federal income taxation was first established in 1902 in Sweden. The tax schedule was progressive in nature, rested on joint taxation of all sources of income, and the same schedule applied to married couples as well as to singles. In 1952, two separate federal schedules, one for couples and one for singles, were introduced. 5 The construction of these two schedules implied that, up to a certain limit, the total federal tax paid by two spouses equalled the tax paid by two singles, where each single earns half of total family earnings. Hence, to some extent the system was a split system of the type that is currently in use in Germany.
Optional separate taxation came into place in 1966, a law change that was motivated by concerns about married women's labour force participation. This meant that filers could apply for being taxed according to the schedule for singles given that this minimised the total tax payments of the family. Around 5 percent of the population utilized this option, which only involved the federal tax payment and the pension insurance fee, not the local tax rates. 6 As displayed in Figure 2 , the option implied that the pre-reform marginal tax rate fell at the point where it is was more beneficial for the family to choose separate taxation. The location of this point was of course a function of the husband's income.
Local tax rates were proportional and decided at the level of the parishes, municipalities and counties. Before the 1971 reform, local taxes paid the previous year was deductible against the assessed income at the federal level. Furthermore, prior to 1971 the marginal effects arising from the local and federal tax schedules could be mitigated by a deduction for work ('förvärvsavdrag'). This could be claimed by all women with positive earnings. For married women without children the deduction was just a minor lump sum deduction.
However, for married women with children below 16 in the household, the deduction was phased in as 25 percent of her earnings up to SEK 78,800, an earnings range where many married women were located in 1969. 7 This lowered her effective marginal tax rate in this range. The essential ingredients of the 1971 reform were:
 The two separate tax schedules for couples and singles were replaced by a federal tax schedule common to all individuals regardless of marital status. For couples, labour incomes became taxed separately, whereas unearned income and wealth still were jointly taxed. 6 The pension insurance fee was levied on the federal taxable income progressively and was essentially a sort of 'federal' income tax. 7 Henceforth, all nominal values are expressed in the price level of 2006.
 The deduction for local taxes was abolished. Since local taxes prior to the reform were deducted against a progressive schedule this move substantially increased tax progressivity. 
Methodological issues

The model framework
Throughout the analysis I make the standard assumption that the wife maximizes her utility while taking the husband's earnings as given and as fully disposable for consumption and that the budget constraint binds. Let f denote 'female' and m 'male' ( m f j ,  ). The labor supply function of the wife can then be written as
where j H is hours of work, j ŵ is the net hourly wage rate and S is family unearned income.
While the exogeneity assumption with respect to the husband's work hours might not be valid for all families it is certainly a more realistic description of family decision making in Sweden in the 1970's than present.
Empirical model
Following a large body of works on female labor force participation (e.g. Eissa and Hoynes 2004) I will assume that the work decision is a function of the average tax rate at a fixed hours choice. The following semi-log participation equation serves as a point of departure 8 :
where it P is the probability to be in the labour force for individual i at year t.
A it
 is the average tax rate at the fixed hours choice, it w the gross wage rate, it R is non-labor income, it X is a vector of sociodemographic characteristics, t  is a time fixed effect, i  is an individual level fixed effect and it e , finally, is the idiosyncratic error term. The linear probability model has been chosen so that individual fixed effects can be accommodated in the regression framework. Indeed, consistent estimation of the relevant marginal effects would not have been feasible in a non-linear model such as logit or probit due to the incidental parameter problem.
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A well-known methodological problem when estimating the discrete labour supply margin is that market wages are unobservable for non-participants. 10 In what follows, I will address this problem by assuming that the log hourly wage rate is given by a linear function 
Combining (2) and (3) yields
where
. Note that the leading idea of the empirical model is to identify variation in net hourly wage rates by the exogenous variation in average net-of-tax shares provided by the 1971 income tax reform. The empirical strategy is in the spirit of a difference-indifference model: I compare pre-reform and post-reform employment outcomes for those who faced relatively large and relatively small increases in the log of the net-of-tax share,
, while controlling for a common time trend and a set of observable characteristics.
The key exclusion restriction when estimating (4) is that 0
This, for instance, rules out any general equilibrium effects from the tax reform on wages, which would introduce a correlation between the key regressors and it  . The foremost advantage of the approach chosen here, as opposed to imputing wage rates, is that the imputation method typically relies on more controversial exclusion restrictions. To be able to identify the hourly wage rate in the main equation, it is often assumed that the education variables determine labour supply only trough the hourly wage rate.
An important feature of (4), which typically has been absent in related studies conducted on repeated cross sections (Eissa (1995 (Eissa ( ,1996 , Crossley and Jeon (2007) and
LaLumia (2008)), is the individual level fixed effect i  . Remember that the pre-reform level of average tax rates is a function of the income of the husband. How spousal characteristics relate to each other has been analysed both theoretically and empirically in a substantial literature on marriage and assortative mating. 11 In my sample it is visible that women married to high-income and low-income men are highly heterogeneous with respect to observable characteristics like educational attainment. It would therefore be a very strong assumption to posit that women married to low-income and high-income men would not differ in relevant unobserved characteristics (e.g. tastes for work) as well.
Key independent variables
To arrive at appropriate exogenous measures of net-of-tax shares I make use of available information on the wage and hours distributions for the relevant time period. Since median work hours for Swedish married women belonging to the labor force was 30 hours a week both before and after the reform I set the fixed hours choice to 30 hours a week, which corresponds to 1,560 yearly work hours. 12 Alternative fixed hours choices will be considered in a sensitivity analysis. Gross hourly wage rates have been imputed based on variables on age, region and education. Since there is no data on wages in LINDA covering the relevant time period I have consulted an auxiliary data source -the Swedish Level of Living Survey.
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The average net-of-tax share, ) 1 (
, is defined in the following way:
11 See e.g. Pencavel (1998b B comprises variables for educational status, age and dummies for each county that are present both in the LINDA data set and in the Swedish Level of Living Survey. To account for time heterogeneity in the returns to education and regional demand conditions I estimate the two years separately. The wage variable is then inflated to the wage level for the relevant year by a wage index. To account for unobserved differences between non-worker and workers I have also estimated two-step Heckman selection models, but the selection term turned out to be of minor importance both years and was excluded from the imputation procedure. The second key regressor, non-labor income, R, is defined as
Thus, the main component of non-labour income is the earnings of the husband minus the tax payments given that the wife works zero hours. TRANSFERS include child allowances and housing allowances. These were both non-taxable transfers. 14 It should be emphasized that I have excluded both positive and negative capital income from Q . The reason is that the main bulk of both positive and negative unearned income relates to investments in owner-occupied housing. To a substantial degree, housing investment decisions and work decisions are determined simultaneously. Therefore, capital income is exluded from Q. This endogeneity problem was also noted by Gustafsson and Jacobsson (1985) who excluded deductions from their non-labor income measure.
15 14 These transfers have been computed based on the socio-demographic characteristics in the censuses. See Appendix A for a description.
15 When positive and negative capital income is added to Q considerably higher non-labor income elasticities are obtained in the main specification. However, it is impossible to give these elasticity estimates a causal interpretation since the variation in non-labor income is then driven by endogenous investments in housing. If one instead exploits the non-labor income measure defined by (6) as an instrument for the endogenous non-labor income regressor one obtains IV regression results that are close to the estimates from the OLS regressions reported below in Table 1 .
Control variables
Needless to say, the labor supply decision is of course affected by the number of children in the household. Therefore, I include the number of pre-school children (0-6 years of age) and the number of school children (7-15 years of age) in the household. 16 One factor that undeniably had consequences for the costs of working was the rapid expansion of publicly provided and heavily subsidized day care facilities in Sweden, an expansion that was carried out at the level of municipalities. From April 1 1971 to April 1 1976 the share of pre-school children that was enrolled in subsidized day care increased from 10 percent to almost 20 percent. But the variation in levels and in changes between municipalities was large. Under the assumption that each individual woman is atomistic and does not affect the total provision of day care in the municipality I will include a regressor for the local day care density in the regressions to account for this variation. 17 This variable measures the share of the number of pre-school children in the municipality that was enrolled in subsidized day care. Since day care also played a role as a crucial employer for women this variable surely also picks up a demand effect. Therefore, I also interact this share with the number of pre-school children.
I also include two dummy variables for education that are time-invariant. Their effect on labour supply might, however, be non-constant through time owing to changes in the wage structure and other factors. Thus, I let the educational dummies interact with the time dummy for 1975. On the same grounds, I also interact a set of county dummies with the time dummy.
Data and descriptive statistics
The data source
The primary data source for this work is LINDA ( data of this kind is available for surrounding years. Second, the reform was announced in the 18 Even though non-married cohabiting couples with common children were treated as married couples for tax purposes I will only include married women in the study. This has been necessary since partners to cohabiting sampled individuals have not been included in the source data set. 19 Since unearned income not exceeding SEK 1000 in 1969 and SEK 2000 in 1975 was classified as earned income I have required earnings to exceed these limits. The key elasticity estimates in this paper only change slightly if one instead requires earnings to be positive without any restrictions. Moreover, there are other caveats associated with data from administrative registers. In 1974 unemployment benefits and sickness benefits became taxable. Fortunately, from 1974 and onwards LINDA includes information from the register of income statements about the level of these benefits. Thus, in order to obtain a constant earnings measure I have subtracted these social benefits from the 1975 earnings measure. 20 While data from tax registers are available annually from 1968 and onwards, the censuses were only conducted every fifth year. The latter were based on questionnaires that all Swedish residents were required by law to fill in and return to the authorities. As a consequence, the response rates were extremely high. See SCB (1974, 1979 , brief English summaries are included) for detailed descriptions of the censuses.
spring of 1970 (Elvander 1972 exclude women who received farm income or income from self-employment or who were married to a spouse who earned income from any of these sources. This is because special tax rules applied to these groups. I also deleted around 450 observations that lacked data on education level. In addition, I restrict the sample to those wives whose husbands had positive earnings and positive federal taxable income in both years. 22 The enumerated requirements are fulfilled by 20,478 women.
Finally, wives married to husbands with a taxable income in the lowest bracket will be left out from the estimation sample. The motivation is that a non-negligible fraction of these households reside there for transitory reasons. In the presence of considerable mean reversion in husband's income, the tax incentive of the wife is also highly transitory in nature. The problem is amplified by the fact that social benefits were taxable in 1975 but non-taxable in 1969. This implies that the spousal income of those at the bottom of the taxable earnings distribution is measured with error. 23 After this exclusion, 18,069 married women remains. 21 Unfortunately, the data problems for 1970 described above prohibit any assessment of whether or not there was a discontinuity in the change in employment status in 1971 among the "treated" wives. 22 The budget constraints for households where no one of the spouses works are not possible to observe. Many of these households are not obliged to file tax returns and could potentially rely on various sorts of assistance that are not visible in my data. 23 To get an idea of the magnitude of this measurement problem I subtracted social benefits (unemployment and sickness benefits) from taxable earnings in 1975 and created deciles based on this adjusted taxable earnings measure, which is comparable with the statutory one in 1969. I then viewed the fraction of social benefits to the adjusted taxable earnings measure in 1975 by deciles. The summary statistics were striking: the ratio of mean tax rates that are less increasing in the earned income of the husband. This group consists of women with kids. As described in section 3, these were entitled to a more generous deduction for work than women without kids. There is also a substantial cross sectional variation in tax rates that originates from differences in local tax rates in both years. The evolution of non-labour income between the two years is of course also a central part of the story. From Figure 6 it is visible that non-labor income decreased dramatically in the upper deciles between the two years. To obtain a view on to what extent the changes in the income tax system mechanically is responsible for this trend I recomputed then non-labor income variable for 1975 while assuming that the husband's earned income in 1975 was taxed according to the 1969 income tax laws. 24 As can be seen from Figure 6 , when holding the 1969 income tax system fixed between the two years the relatively slower non-labor income growth in the upper deciles is less dramatic. Still, the growth is relatively faster at the bottom part of the income distribution. This phenomenon can be ascribed to a general compression of the wage structure, which earlier has been documented elsewhere by, for instance, Edin and Holmlund (1995) . The sharp increase in income tax payments in upper deciles is mainly due to the abolishment of the deduction for local taxes paid the previous year. 
A look at the data
Regression results
Baseline results
The baseline specification follows from equation (4) participation probability with respect the net-of-tax share is estimated to be 0.46. 25 Even though comparisons with traditional labor supply estimates must be done with great care, the "net-wage" elasticity is of expected sign and in the range of previously estimated female wage elasticities on Swedish data. 26 Moreover, the net-of-tax share elasticity is by far significantly different from zero at a level of 1 percent and precisely estimated. It is also interesting that a non-negligible non-labor income elasticity is detected: the non-labor income elasticity is estimated to be -0.14. This is the sign to be expected -when income in the state of non-work increases the employment probability should decrease. One should notice that also the nonlabor income elasticity is estimated to be significantly different from zero at a level of 1 percent.
In column (2) and (3) the fixed-effects model is compared to the corresponding random-effects model (column 2) and pooled OLS-model (column 3). In the alternative models both key elasticities are estimated to be larger in absolute terms when compared to the fixed-effects case. Note that if the tax reform would have been purely exogenous, i.e. if the variation in the net-of-tax share would have been random and uncorrelated to unobserved individual heterogeneity, pooled estimation, fixed-effects estimation and random-effects estimation would all yield consistent estimates, but the latter the most efficient ones. Here a Hausman test forcefully rejects the joint hypothesis that the coefficient estimates for the log net-of-tax share and non-labour income are equal in column 1 and 2. 27 This clearly indicates that the inclusion of fixed effects in equation (4) is of importance to the regression results. 25 When using the notation in equation (4) the net-of-tax share elasticity is given by In line with our prior expectations, the number of pre-school kids in the household strongly reduces the probability to be employed, although at a decreasing rate. The negative effect from kids in school age is, however, considerably smaller. In the main specification (column 1), the coefficient for the control variable for the local day care density is positive, as expected, and significant, whereas the coefficient for the interaction between day care density and the number of pre-school children is insignificant.
As explained above, the interactions between the year dummy for 1975 and the age, education and region variables are included in order to control in a flexible way for time trends related to these variables. The negative coefficient for the interaction between the time dummy for 1975 and the dummy for more than 9 years of schooling makes sense since this period saw a decline in the returns to education (Edin and Holmlund 1995).
Heterogeneous response
Previous works on female labour supply to taxation in Sweden has typically been conducted on smaller survey data sets. And as far as I know, the Swedish literature has so far been silent on the issue whether there are heterogeneous responses among married women with and without children. Table 2 reveals that the overall response reported in Table 1 undeniably masks substantial heterogeneity between wives with and without kids. The selection of the two subsamples was described in section 5. Indeed, women with kids exhibit a noticeably higher net-of-tax share elasticity --1.77 which can be compared with 0.36 for women without kids. 28 Interestingly, none of the subsamples responds in a significant way to the changes in non-labor income between the two years.
From Figure 5 we have already seen that the pre-reform level of employment was considerably lower among women with kids both years. The diverging sizes of the elasticity estimates for the two groups presumably relates to taste differences between the groups that also might help explain why employment was so low among females with kids in 1969.
Sensitivity analysis
In this paper I have approximated the relevant budget constraint of the individual with her average tax rate at a certain level of predicted earnings. As explained in section 4, in the main specification I arrive at this level of earnings by imputing hourly wage rates and by setting the amount of weekly work hours to 30, which was the median level of weekly work hours both in 1968 and 1974. One might wonder though what happens if one instead uses 40 weekly work hours, the mode value both years (conditional on positive hours). 40 hours also correspond to full-time work. Column 1 of Table 3 shows that the estimated net-of-tax share elasticity then increases to 0.58 (from 0.47), while the estimate of the non-labor income elasticity only slightly changes. According to the hours distributions reported in Appendix B, a third natural point for evaluating a fixed hours choice is 20 hours a week. As can be seen from column 2 the estimated net-of-tax share elasticity then falls to 0.29. The non-labor income elasticity is estimated to be -0.13. In similarity with Eissa and Hoynes (2004) who analyzed U.S. data with related techniques I also find a difference in "net wage elasticities" depending on whether the point of evaluation is 20 or 40 weekly work hours.
29 29 In this case, an explanation to the observed pattern in estimated net-of-tax share elasticities is that the change in log net-of-tax shares between the two years was larger at the top of the income distribution when evaluated at 20 hours. Clearly, this phenomenon relates to the optional separate tax system that was in place in 1969. As can be seen from Figure 2 , when the earnings of the wife exceeded a certain threshold a separate tax schedule applied. To some degree, this equalized tax payments among wives married to low-and high income husband and thereby reduced variation in pre-reform tax rates at higher levels of the earnings of the wife. (See also # cross sectional obs. 18069 18069 18069 Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. * denotes significance at 10%, ** significance at 5% and *** significance at 1%. Standard errors for elasticities have been obtained by the delta method. Elasticities are evaluated at sample means. The specifications reported in column 2 and 3 also include variables for age, age squared, 9 years of schooling, more than 9 years of schooling and a set of region dummies. Another concern that can be raised is that the employment definition used in the analysis is too generous. As explained in section 5. 
Simulating the reform effect
To In general, the tax reform influences labour supply through two channels. First, it affects the net wage through the average tax rate. Second, it has an effect on non-labour 30 It is a well known problem with the linear probability model that it generates predictions outside the feasible range. When plugging in the actual values of the independent variables, my main specification gives 2 predictions outside the feasible range in 1969 and 7 predictions of this kind in 1975. Since the mean value of the fixed effects have been normalized to zero in the estimations, the mean value of the predictions for each year equals the actual mean value of employment status.
income through the net-of-tax earnings of the spouse. To begin with, in simulation 1a reported
in Table 4 I have also performed simulations where I have kept the whole 1969 tax and transfer system constant through 1975. In addition to the statutory income tax, the tax and transfer system also includes pay-roll taxes, VAT, child allowances and housing allowances.
Throughout, I have assumed that the burden of pay-roll and VAT taxation is fully borne by the individual. As outlined in section 3, indirect taxes sharply increased between 1969 and 1975. As can be seen from simulation 2a, the positive effect from the introduction of separate taxation was probably to some extent offset by the surge in indirect taxes. Indeed, when keeping the whole tax and transfer system at the 1969 level and only simulating the net-of-tax share, the reform effect is considerably smaller, namely 0.04. On the other hand, the increase in indirect taxes pushes down non-labour income as well. This has a positive impact on female employment. Thus, when both the net-of-tax share and non-labor income are simulated (simulation 2b) the reform effect is estimated to be 0.07.
Concluding discussion
In this paper I have utilized the quasi-experimental nature of the 1971 Swedish individual tax reform in combination with a rich panel data source to assess the impact from the reform along the extensive margin. Crucially, the panel structure of the data has allowed me to address issues of unobserved heterogeneity. In a first step I estimated employment elasticities.
The overall net-of-tax share elasticity was estimated to be 0.46 and the non-labour income elasticity was -0.14. However, I also found that the net-of-tax share elasticity was considerably higher among women who had kids in both years. Since long it has been recognized that the structure of the income tax system appears to be an important determinant of married women's labor force participation. In fact, the main motive for the individual tax reform of 1971 was to promote female labour force participation. Numerous papers have set out to explain the impact from the family tax system on female labor supply based on cross sectional data. 32 In contrast to this earlier literature, this paper instead directly exploits a family tax reform in Sweden that occurred in a historical situation when Swedish female labor market participation was close to today's OECD average. It has become one of the main political priorities for policy makers world-wide to enhance female labor force participation. Jaumotte (2003) has shown that there is a crosscountry correlation between the average tax rate facing the secondary earner in the household and the female participation rate in the OECD. Needless to say, the exact magnitude of the simulation results in this paper should be interpreted with caution. However, the results in this study nonetheless indicate that that the Swedish family tax reform did make a difference and that this difference appears to be considerable. 
A.2. Public transfers.
Two public transfers are relevant to the studied population -housing allowances and child allowances. Both years, families were entitled to a housing allowance that was designed to compensate families for their housing costs. The basic structure of the allowance was that a maximum allowance first was computed as a function of the number of children in the family, 
